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In November the W.W. Norton Co. puWi$1J~4 Jean Monnet: The First:States'fu:an :of 
Interdependence, by British author Fran9oisDtichene3 a?European cofi:espondent of t(fileJean 
Monnet Council. Few could be better qualified to write~ biographyof Monnet. In:J951 he 
wrote a series of articles on the Schuman Plan for the Manch~ster Guardian, and unlike most · 
British journalists he was in favor of European unification. Jean Monnet took an interestin :: 
the young journalist, who was fluent in botfrFrench and English, and hired him as lifilson to 
the Anglo-American press. By March, 1958, he was Monnet's chief of staff, writm:gpapers 
and speeches for Monnet and joining in policy decisfons as a member of Monnet' s inner 
circle. Now, after years of research, he has completed whatis perhaps the definitive: ·. 
biography of Monnet, an engaging .work which fills in many of the gaps in Monnefs yaluable 
but enigmatic Memoirs. Members of the Council supported Duchene's project fromdts 
beginning. 
Duchene subsequently toured the United States to promote the new book, with t:he 
support of the Monnet Council. Afterwards, he ·was asked to give his impressions of the 
current state of European politics. These are presented here. 
The accession of Jacques Chirac to the presidency in France and the disastrous showing of 
the Conservatives in the recent local elections in Britain add new unknowns to the prospects for 
reform of the European Union (EU) . European integration, having taken giant steps forward from 
1986 to 1992 with the implementation of the Single Market and with the Maastricht Treaty 
providing for economic and monetary union (EMU) , is now well into one of its periodic phases of 
confusion again. 
The current European political agenda derives entirely from the Maastricht Treaty and has 
three aspects. 
The first is Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the single biggest element in the 
Maastricht treaty signed at the end of 1991. Because the Maastricht treaty has been signed and 
ratified and contains rules for implementing EMU, this is much the best defined area in the 
integration schedule. 
The second set of issues is not about implementing what has already been enshrined in the 
Maastricht treaty , but about facing up to what was deliberately left out of it. The member states 
were unable to agree in the Maastricht negotiations on how to fortify the supranational governing 
bodies of the European Union in the light of impending enlargement to much of eastern Europe and 
a possible EU of 27 states . They put off reform of the EU institutions to an intergovernmental 
conference (I GC) next year which could last far into 1997. 
Finally, there is a third term, because the Maastricht treaty extended the EU to cover foreign 
affairs and security, home affairs and justice. But these touch the heart of sovereignty, and are 
subject to national vetoes in the traditional diplomatic style. Policy-making in these fields tends to 
directorates of the larger states as in a concert of powers. 
The difficulties in tackling all but the last category of issues are due in large part part to the 
very success of integration in the phase before the Maastricht treaty. The Single Market has 
inserted Europe really for the first time into the politics and social life of the ever increasing number 
of member states. The Common Market Commission always claimed it was "not in business but in 
politics". Until recently, this never quite carried conviction with voters because the impact was 
confined mainly to businessmen and bureaucrats. This has completely changed of late. Parliaments 
realise how much is going through the European not national legislative pipelines. Germans fear 
for the DM, Frenchmen for farming, Spaniards for their fishermen, the British for their identity, 
and so on. Governments whose agents still like to think of themselves as servants of great powers 
dislike intensely the growing constraints on their freedom to act unilaterally. A political threshold 
has been reached on the road to European unity which is hard to cross. 
All this has been given a popular (or unpopular) twist by the increasing threat in the 1990s to 
the welfare state. The growing marginalisation of the unskilled male worker, high rates of longterm 
unemployment, unrest around the ghettoes, rising job insecurity for the educated middle classes, the 
stench of corruption arising from politics and the boardrooms, all have tended to alienate the mass 
of voters from government of any kind and provided fertile soil for populists, nationalists, 
protectionist and racists. European integration which involves an opening out from the old familiar 
national ethos into a larger world, is vulnerable to this mood of angry closing in on the self. One 
might expect a reviving economy to moderate such feelings. A sign that matters may be changing 
in greater depth than this is that economic improvement, though marked in exports and 
manufacturing, has yet to translate into relief for the mass of voters. 
In short, Europe, at the point where it might graduate from the old Community approach to 
the greater commitments of political union is entangled not just in the passions of national 
sovereignty familiar from the past, but with the sourness against all layers of government which has 
flowered so rapidly of recent years. 
EMU is unique in the present political turmoil over Europe in that the process to put it into 
effect is already a matter of accepted law. A process is only a framework for action, not action 
itself. But the rules provide in particular that a minority of countries which feel they can do so, 
should go ahead in 1999 onwards, even if others do not. Such a "two speed" approach by which 
the more dynamic countries forge ahead has always been the sine qua non of progress to unity. 
Further, if EMU were achieved, the commitments to joint policy making it would demand would 
constitute a large part of political union. 
EMU would differ from the present system of DM leadership in two respects : speculation in 
EMU currencies on world financial markets would be eliminated because the DM would 
automatically provide total backing to the single currency system; and EMU would extend command 
decision-making so far into the budget, tax, credit and other financial policies, that it would 
constitute by far the most powerful cement of a political union Europe has ever known. On the 
other hand, there is always the possibility that countries which suffer high rates of unemployment to 
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keep up in the hard currency stakes, might at some point face social upheavals and drop out. So 
long as there is no European government, only a board of governors of central banks, social-
political strains could always lead to a break-up . 
In fact , the social strains testing most of Europe in the 1990s raise doubts about the ability to 
achieve EMU on anything like schedule. Chirac's main policy plank, reminiscent of Mitterand's on 
arrival into power in 1981, is to roll back unemployment. France's, at 12 percent, is the highest of 
any of the richer EU countries and casts a dark shadow across a reviving economy, strong franc and 
striking export surpluses. Rolling back unemployment is probably as incompatible with a hard franc 
and EMU as was Mitterand' s experiment in reflation from 1981-1983. 1 Given Chirac's well-
attested unpredictability, a major question mark hangs over France in a single European currency. 
Without France, EMU would simply be another name for the existing DM zone and bring no 
change. The French dilemma and Chirac conundrum are therefore basic to EU prospects. 
As regards the reform of EU institutions in the light of enlargement, there are no accepted 
guidelines. Chancellor Kohl has talked in terms of achieving European Union beyond challenge in 
his time. But this is the area where the combined opposition of establishments and populists is most 
marked . 
Hitherto, it has looked as if the IGC might be a struggle between the British and French 
Gaullists, seeking to limit or even erode the supranational features of the EC, and the Germans and 
other states to strengthen them. The position of the federalists, as expressed by the supposedly 
cautious new president of the Commission, Jacques Santer, whom Kohl put in office, is that 
majority voting in the Council of Ministers should be extended, potentially to all decision-making in 
the EU except defence and taxation. In return majority voting might be defined in a more 
demanding way than it is now. It is not enough, in a much enlarged Union, to extend majority 
voting mechanically. A majority of states with only a minority of population or a majority of the 
population with only a minority of the states -- both possible in a Union of 27 countries and 480 
million people -- will seem unfair. 2 In future, decisions will require a double majority of states and 
people alike. The federalists also consider that the only way to make the EU genuinely democratic 
is to reinforce the European Parliament (EP). The Parliament's powers were belatedly increased in 
the 1980s so that it now has a de facto veto on a good proportion of EU laws. The federalists wish 
to give it powers of "co-decision" with the Council of Ministers on all EU legislation. 
The present British government, at the other extreme, stresses that it will keep open its 
options on EMU; opposes any increase in the powers of the EP or in majority voting in the Council 
of Ministers; and would prefer to reduce those that exist. It would like to give greater powers to 
1 Yet Austria, a highly developed economy more closely tied to that of Germany than any 
other, has under 5 percent unemployed. 
2 In an EU of 27 states, Germany, Britain, France and Italy together would have over 53 
percent of the population (255 million) but on present weighting rules less than 32 percent of 
the votes in the Council of Ministers. Fourteen states with less than 10 million people each 
would have less than 12 percent of the population (56 million) and 31 percent of the votes , 
virtually as many as the Big Four together with less people than any one of them. 
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national parliaments to deal with EU legislation at the expense of the EP. 3 It is keen to emphasise 
intergovernmental cooperation on foreign and security policies. These are formally part of the EU 
but in fact amount to a directorate of the larger powers.4 All this is just as attractive to the French 
establishment (and parts of the German) as to the British. The difference is that the French place a 
higher price on the link with the Germans and are keener than the British on EMU, both of which 
attitudes, if maintained, might make them more open to compromise. 
However, of late, the situation has become more complex than a straight federal-national 
clash. If the IGC lasts beyond the spring of 1997, the other governments might be dealing with 
Blair and the Labour party . Blair, though as "pragmatic" as any of the British, is likely to be more 
flexible than the embattled Major, notably concerning the European Parliament. Though all national 
parliaments resent the EP as an upstart, and the Mother of Parliaments does so perhaps more than 
most, Labour is more open than the Thatcher-ridden Tories to the argument that the EU should act 
as a democracy, not a cartel of governments. In Germany also the situation is less clear cut than 
might have been assumed a few months ago. Kohl and the Christian Democrats seem the stoutest 
champions both of enlargement of the Eu to the east and of strengthening its institutions. But the 
foreign ministry, under the Liberal, Kinkel, has been hinting that the IGC might be a relatively 
minor affair. The reasoning is that since enlargement is not imminent, difficult decisions might be 
put off until it is. This may not last, because one of the key conditions placed by chancellor Kohl 
and the German CDU on EMU still seems to be that the EU should be fortified by moves in the 
direction of political union. So long as that remains true, the problems of EMU, enlargement and 
EU reform will all be interdependent. But that also means that if the will to EMU were to weaken, 
the whole web could unravel. 
The dangers of such a situation are evident. If the Germans, under Helmut Kohl, who has 
sworn to complete European unity in his time in office, draw back now, one may ask how they 
might stand to gain from more directorates than the French or British. Also the growing 
unwillingness of N orthem states to pay for budget transfers to the poorer members of (mainly but 
not only) the South and presumably in the future the East, will restrict the European solidarity which 
has been one of the achievements of the Delors era. It is quite easy to build disenchanted scenarios, 
as Delors did sometimes in the past, along the lines that if the federation cannot move forward, the 
EU could regress to a free trade area and to the traditional interstate diplomacy of unhappy memory. 
The European rhetoric of alarm has always claimed that what cannot move forward must sooner or 
later fall back. 
Yet the corollary, that which cannot fall back presumably at some point has good chances of 
moving forward, has in practice been more in evidence. There are many reasons for thinking this 
may well remain the case. The EU is now an elaborate structure with a rule of law affecting in 
3 Proposals have been vague, probably because there are no convincing solutions along such 
lines . The main effect could be to handicap decision-making altogether, since no single national 
parliament can effectively oversee decisions taken by shifting majorities of the whole EU. 
4 The results have been evident in Bosnia. Europe has not failed in Bosnia. There has been 
no Europe in Bosnia. There has been a directorate of big powers (Germany, France, Britain) 
variously cooperating or at odds with each other and with other big powers (USA, Russia). 
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depth a wide swathe of the economy. The member states and business have a great interest in its 
effective operation. Beyond this, the basic aim of western European societies seems to be stability. 
There are none of the raging ambitions that seethed below the surface between the wars. In the last 
resort, the EU is the embodiment of this desire for stability and peace. It frees German power by 
providing a generally acceptable context for it. It is the only policy France has for feeling 
comfortable with that power. For the smaller countries, which are neither seen nor heard in the old 
dispensation of great power rivalries, it has brought unprecedented influence and freedom from 
anxiety . It so happens that the vast majority of the present membership, as well as of future 
candidates, are small countries . It is most unlikely that they will sign away their main guarantee 
against the major powers , the EU's supranational institutions. Even the European Parliament has 
already been given sufficient powers to develop in the years to come. 
The British, who have never given overriding priority to German policy , and perhaps the 
Scandinavians, may not be very sensitive to these security considerations, but the Continentals are. 
Unlike the British, they fear that if the goal of closer union were ever given up, the political 
stability which has been its main achievement might begin to come apart at the seams. This is likely 
to be as true of the east European states as of the present continental members. In this spirit, the 
Germans have proposed, and look like getting, Europol, a European FBI to fight international crime 
across the EU. Under Mitterand, the French and Germans have also proposed a common European 
budget for defence procurement. Whether or not Chirac confirms this, such initiatives show there is 
still scope for incremental steps to European Union. 
The prospect, then, is much less likely to be an unwinding of the EU than a gradual 
evolutionary growth. As EMU shows, pushing integration forward is no longer a matter only of 
political will by governments. Once unity has reached the heart of national sovereignty, deep social 
and economic structures as well as popular loyalties limit the pace of movement. Advance, which 
in the past half century has been relatively rapid, becomes much more effortful in such heavy soil. 
Developments may henceforth be rather slow. They will be more rapid if EMU surmounts the 
undoubted obstacles to its implementation and is effectively introduced among a core of states . That 
would be a decisive as well as difficult achievement. 
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